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Mapping Civil Society Transplants:
A Preliminary Comparison of Eastern Europe
and Latin America
By JULIE MERTUS*
Attempts to (re)construct the states and territories of Eastern
Europe have called into action numerous civil actors, both foreign and
local, stridently non-governmental and quietly government-sponsored,
geographically-bounded (intra-territory or intra-state) and boundary
crossing (inter-territory or inter-state). Despite their seemingly disparate
appearances, the great majority of these actors share a common ideol-
ogy, or at least, a perceived need to accommodate or struggle against a
controlling paradigm. Two dominant competing ideologies are at play:
liberalism' and nationalism.2 In a complex and dynamic process, civil
actors - non-governmental organizations (NGOs), private voluntary
organizations (PVOs) and other quasi-governmental civil actors - par-
ticipate in the ways these ideologies are produced, interpreted, trans-
formed and/or rejected by the local communities.' A central role in this
* Julie Mertus is an assistant professor of law at Ohio Northern University. She wishes to
thank the MacArthur and Soros Foundations and the Fulbright Commission for their support on
related projects which gave rise to this analysis, and to the suggestions of Nathaniel Berman,
Austin Sarat, Henry Steiner, Thomas Cushman, Keith Krause, Janet Lord, the participants in the
1997 ASIL/ACUNS workshop on "Global Governance" and the participants in Lat Crit II who
provided feedback for this project. Comments welcome and appreciated: j-mertus@onu.edu. A
longer version of this article, focusing on Eastern Europe can be found in 8 SOCIAL & LEGAL
STUDIES 121 (1999).
1. Liberalism is used herein to embody two meanings: (1) the view of the good society based
on a body of economic doctrine known as the "Washington Consensus" which, in the words of
one recent UN publication, extols "the virtues of market liberalization" and privatization (TAYLOR
& PIEPER 7 (1996); see also LuPHART & WAISMAN (1996); AKYUZ (1994)) and; (2) "social
democracy," favoring such attributes as the rule of law over the state, citizen participation in
community and "rights." Neil MacCormick, What Place for Nationalism in the Modern World?
in NATIONAL RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS 34-42 (Simon Caney et al. eds., Westview
Press, 1993).
2. Nationalism is used herein in the sense of "ethnic nationalism," that is communities of
sentiment, as opposed to civic nationalism, a concept more neatly tied to the need to create a state.
WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP 24 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1995). This definition
draws from the work of Max Weber, who explained that the concept of a nation means above all
that it is proper to expect from certain groups a specific sentiment of solidarity in the face of other
groups." Max Weber, Political Communities, in ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 921-26 (Guenther Roth
& Klaus Wittich, eds., 1968). A full discussion of nationalism is beyond the scope of this paper;
for bibliographies on nationalism, see MONTSERRAT GUIBERNAU, NATIONALISMS: THE NATION-
STATE AND NATIONALISM IN THE TWENTETH CENTURY (Polity Press 1996); Kymlicka, supra; and,
DAVID MILLER, ON NATIONALITY (Oxford Univ. Press 1995).
3. Chadwick F. Alger, Local Responses to Global Intrusions, in INDIVIDUATION AND
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process is played by a complex and shifting array of "legal fields" - the
ensemble of institutions and practices through which law is incorporated
into social decision-making.4
The presence of outsiders in Eastern Europe, pushing their own
agenda for political, economic and social change, is not without prece-
dent. Civil foreign intervention played and continues to play a critical
role in the political, social and economic transformation of Latin Ameri-
can countries.' To some extent, recent developments with respect to for-
eign intervention in Eastern Europe appears remarkably reminiscent of
earlier efforts in Latin America that have been highly criticized.6 How-
ever, the approach taken by civil intervenors in Eastern Europe has dif-
fered greatly from that evidenced in Latin America. This essay suggests
the assumptions of foreign intervenors today in Eastern Europe and then
suggests ways in which the work of foreign intervenors in Latin
America differs. This essay suggests that the main differences are
informed by the nature of the relationship of dominant world powers to
prior regimes, in particular, the legacy of colonialism in Latin America
as opposed to the aftertaste of Cold War politics in Eastern Europe.
Part I discusses each of these three methodological assumptions of
civil intervenors in Eastern Europe in turn and suggests counter-orienta-
tions. Then, Part II compares this Eastern European civil intervenor tem-
plate to the approach generally taken in Latin America.
PART ONE: METHODOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS OF CIVIL INVERVENORS
IN EASTERN EUROPE
Despite their best intentions, Western intervenors in the post-Cold
War states of Eastern Europe tend to labor under assumptions which
undercut their ability to act as a positive, transformative force.7 Three
such assumptions can be identified as follows:
1. Ideologies have converged into one alternative: liberalism.
GLOBALIZATION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF TERRITORIAL SOCIETIES AND TERRITORIAL IDENTITIES
77-104 (Zdravko Mlinar ed., Avebury 1992).
4. DAVID M. TRUBEK ET AL., GLOBAL RESTRUCTURING AND THE LAW: THE
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF LEGAL FIELDS AND THE CREATION OF TRANSNATIONAL AREAS.
(GLOBAL STUDIES RESEARCH PROGRAM WORKING PAPER SERIES, 1993). For this process in
Eastern Europe, see Harold J. Berman, The Struggle for Rights in Post-Soviet Russia, in WESTERN
RIGHTS? POST-COMMUNIST APPLICATION 41 (Andras Sajo ed., 1996). See also, Gianmaria Ajani,
By Chance and By Prestige: Legal Transplants in Russia and Eastern Europe, 43 AM. J. COMP. L.
93 (1995).
5. One of the most influential studies of democratic transitions in Latin America is
GUILLERMO O'DONNELL et. al., TRANSITIONS FROM AUTHORITARIAN RULE (1986).
6. See JAMES GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS AND FOREIGN AID IN
LATIN AMERICA (1980).
7. See Mertus, supra note *
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2. Knowledge is located in one form and one place.
3. Political space can be compartmentalized between the local and
the global and the state, the individual and the international.
A. The Notion of Convergence
To date, the dominant program throughout Central and Eastern
Europe has been based on the idea of convergence. Convergence is the
notion that Communism has been defeated and that all political, legal,
economic and social programs are merging into what is now the only
available alternative: liberalism.8 Francis Fukuyama popularized this
thesis with his declaration in the End of History: "For a very large part
of the world," Fukuyama wrote, "there is now no ideology with preten-
sions to universality that is in a position to challenge liberal democ-
racy. . ." As Rob Walker explains, for many, "the interpretation of
specific events [such as the fall of the Berlin wall] affirms a triumphant
view of history: the conversion of Them into Us (or U.S.), the final
admission that freedom and democracy are to be gained only where the
magical logic of Capitalism and modernity are allowed to cast their spell
over time and space."10  Western intervenors have a particularly easy
time imagining Eastern Europeans turning into "Us"; after all, we imag-
ine that They are already close kin to Us."
For many states and individual actors in Eastern Europe, maintain-
ing power in an increasingly globalized 2 and regionalized' 3 world
8. TONY SPYBEY, GLOBALIZATION AND WORLD SOCIETY 48-49 (Polity Press 1996). See also,
PETER DE CRUZ, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD 477-485 (Cavendish Publ'g 1995).
9. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN 45 (Free Press 1992).
10. R.B.J. WALKER, INSIDEIOUTSIDE: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS POLITICAL THEORY 144
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1993).
11. Cf. BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTION ON THE ORIGINS AND
SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (Verso 1991).
12. Numerous definitions of globalization exist. Mlinar, for example, defines globalization as
"a process extending the determinative frameworks of social change to the world as a whole." He
identifies five dimensions of the globalization: (1) globalization as increasing interdependence at
the world level, wherein the activities of people in specific areas have repercussions that go
beyond local, regional or national borders; (2) globalization as the expansion of domination and
dependence, that is "an inter-connectedness on the global scale, in which radial rather than lateral
links predominate; (3) globalization as homogenization of the world wherein "instead of
differences among territorial units which were mutually exclusive, there is now a uniformity;" (4)
globalization as diversification within "territorial communities" wherein "the level of
globalization can be measured by the extent to which narrow territorial units are open and permit
access to the wealth of diversity of the world as a whole;" (5) globalization as a means of
surmounting temporal discontinuities through "(a) connectedness of the asynchronous rhythms of
different activities and (b) temporal inclusiveness resulting from the functioning of particular
services to global spaces." MLINAR, supra note 3; see also, Richard Falk, Regionalism and World
Order After the Cold War, ST. LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L. J. 71 (1995).
13. Regionalization is in part a by-product of globalization. Stefan Schirm explains that
"transnational actors and systems ... undermine the ability of national governments to shape
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entails propagation and perpetuation of the liberal program. This
includes both an investment in both social democracy and the market-
economical view of a good society. 4 The liberal program is based on
the notion of relatively weak states overseeing free market economies in
which land and property have been privatized. 15 The liberal program
places the rhetoric of democracy at its core although the practice of
democracy may indeed be "thin on the ground."' 6  Therein, "new
democracies" are to operate through a system of "good governance,"
which entails a formula of political parties, independent media, open
elections, transparency in government and a series of checks and bal-
ances in the governing body.' 7 Law plays a crucial role in this picture,
as relations in government and society at large are to be governed by the
rule of law and not brute power. Moreover, the State is to respect indi-
vidual rights, and legal institutions are to be built to keep this system
well-oiled and working. 8 Unification of law is sought to be achieved
through international institutions designed specifically to promote such
unification, such as the Hague Conference on Private International Law
and the UN Commission on International Trade Law, and through
transsovereign cooperative arrangements and transsovereign legislation
applicable to the members of these groups.' 9
politics and make national regulations less attractive and viable. Therefore transnational
globalization stimulates regional governance." STEFAN A. SCHIRM, TRANSNATIONAL
GLOBALIZATION AND REGIONAL GOVERNANCE: ONE OF THE REASONS FOR REGIONAL
COOPERATION IN EUROPE AND THE AMERICAS (Working Paper Series No.6.2., Harvard Univ. Press
1996).
14. MacCormick, supra note 1, at 35.
15. See e.g., JOHNSON ET AL., STARTING OVER IN EASTERN EUROPE: ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND
ECONOMIC RENEWAL (Harvard Bus. School Press 1991). See also, CONSTRUCTING CAPITALISM:
THE REEMERGENCE OF CIVIL SOCIETY AND LIBERAL ECONOMY IN THE POST-COMMUNIST WORLD
(Kazimierz Z Pznanski ed., Westview Press 1992); CHARLES WOLF, JR., PROMOTING DEMOCRACY
AND FREE MARKET IN EASTERN EUROPE (ICS Press 1992); ADAM ZWASS, FROM FAILED
COMMUNISM TO UNDERDEVELOPED CAPITALISM: TRANSFORMATION OF EASTERN EUROPE, THE
POST-SOVIET UNION, AND CHINA (M.E. Sharpe 1995).
16. JOHN DUNN, WESTERN POLITICAL THEORY IN FACE OF THE FUTURE 2 (Cambridge Univ.
Press 1979).
17. See e.g., GORDON CRAWFORD, PROMOTING DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GOOD
GOVERNANCE THROUGH DEVELOPMENT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE POLICIES OF FOUR
NORTHERN DONORS (Center for Democratization Studies, Univ. of Lees 1995). See also,
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, PARTICIPATORY
DEVELOPMENT AND GOOD GOVERNANCE (OECD Publications 1995); B.W.T. MUTHARIKA, ONE
AFRICA, ONE DESTINY: TOWARDS DEMOCRACY, GOOD GOVERNANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT (SAPES
Books 1995).
18. ROUNDTABLE OF MINISTERS OF JUSTICE FROM COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN
EUROPE, THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN A STATE GOVERNED BY THE RULE OF LAW (Council of
Europe Publications 1996). See also, A.E. DICK HOWARD, DEMOCRACY'S DAWN: A DIRECTORY
OF AMERICAN INITIATIVES ON CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW IN
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE (Univ. of Virginia Press 1991).
19. DE CRUZ, supra note 8, at 485.
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Contrary to the notion of convergence and the liberal program that
has been built up around it, is the assumption that multiple and even
conflicting ideologies can and do exist simultaneously. For example, in
the former Yugoslavia, the main competing ideologies are various forms
of nationalism. Whereas dominant powers use race as a construct in
other parts of the world, in Eastern Europe the category of choice for
apportioning benefits and burdens is the "nation." To be sure, national-
isms alone cannot be blamed for the war in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzego-
vina. Rather, nationalisms were a tool for something else - power and
domination - but still nationalisms were a force at play. In the former
Yugoslavia, politicians rekindled nationalist tensions in order to create
the perceived (and then in some cases real) need for their protection
against the "Enemy Other." War then closed the ranks. People through-
out the former Yugoslavia were forced to decide who they were among
three narrow choices: Serb, Croat or Muslim (Bosnjk). This left four
categories of people without any identity: those of mixed parentage or
marriage; those who were of another national identity, such as Albanian
or Hungarian; those who wanted to identify themselves as something
else, either above the nation, such as European, or below the nation,
such as a member of a particular neighborhood or organization; and
those who did not want to participate in the labeling process. In creating
and sanctioning a post-war Bosnia drawn strictly on national lines, the
Dayton Peace Accord 20 merely cemented national divisions. 21 Like it or
not then, nationalisms are a force to be reckoned with in the former
Yugoslavia.22
Moreover, the notion of convergence should be rejected as liber-
alism comes in many varieties. Different models may change their
degree of emphasis on the importance of a classic free market; offer
alternative analyses of individualism and the countervailing imperative
of the collective; and provide their own re-definitions of the public
20. The Dayton Accord, officially known as the General Framework Agreement for Peace in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, is reproduced in UN Doc. A/50/790-S/1995/999 in the form initialed in
Dayton on November 21, 1995. It appears in 35 I.L.M. 89 (1996) in the form signed on December
14, 1995, in Paris. The latter version corrected minor errors in the UN printing.
21. Julie Mertus, Prospects for National Minorities Under the Dayton Accords - Lessons
from History: The Inter-War Minorities Schemes and the "Yugoslav Nations," 23 BROOK. J. INT'L
L. 793 (1998).
22. See e.g., Vojin Dimitrijevic, Ethnonationalism and the Constitution; The Apotheosis of
the Nation-State, 3 J. AREA SUDmES 50 (1993); Zagorka Golubovic, Nationalism and Democracy:
The Yugoslav Case, 3 J. AREA STUDIES 65 (1993); Dusan Janjic, Socialism, Federalism and
Nationalism in (the Former) Yugoslavia: Lessons to be Learned, 3 J. AREA STUDIES 102 (1993);
Shkelzen Maliqi, Albanian Self-Understanding Through Non-Violence: The Construction of
National Identity in Opposition to Serbia, 3 J. AREA STUDIES 120 (1993); Renata Salecl,
Nationalism, Anti-Semitism and Anti-Feminism in Eastern Europe, 2 J. AREA STUDIES 78 (1993).
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sphere, fundamental rights and civic culture. 23 Indeed liberalism can be
and is combined with other ideologies, including nationalism.
24
Liberalism and nationalism are usually posited as irreparably at
odds with one another, as the claims of the nation often infringe upon
the currently recognized borders of existing sovereign states.25 Nations
clash with states in many ways. The legitimization of states stems from
geographic boundaries; in contrast, the legitimization of nations stems
from "communities of sentiment," from imagined and real histories of
belonging.26 State sovereignty traditionally stresses the link between the
state authority and a set of political institutions that serve individual
political beings; 27 national sovereignty stresses the link between the
national authority and a defined population united as a self-identifying
group.28
This is not to suggest that liberalism and nationalism are inevitably
incompatible; they could in fact be combined as liberal nationalism.
Underlying nationalism, as Yael Tamir argues, is a range of perceptive
understandings about the human situation, of what makes life meaning-
ful and creative, as well as, a set of praiseworthy values. 29 Tamir reasons
that by nature individuals are members of communities of sentiment and
belonging. 30 Outside such communities, "their lives become meaning-
less; there is no substance to their reflection, no set of norms and values
of light of which they can make choices and become the free, autono-
mous persons that liberals assume them to be."' 31 This vision of national-
ism complements liberalism:
Liberals can acknowledge the importance of belonging, membership,
and cultural affiliations, as well as the particular moral commitments
that follow from them. Nationalists can appreciate the value of per-
23. Cf SEYLA BENHABIB, SITUATING THE SELF: GENDER, COMMUNITY AND POSTMODERNISM
IN CONTEMPORARY ETHICS (Routledge 1992); THOMAS BRIDGES, THE CULTURE OF CITIZENSHIP:
INVENTING POSTMODERN CIVIC CULTURE (State Univ. of New York Press 1994); Stephen
Gardbaum, Liberalism, Autonomy, and Moral Conflict, 48 STAN. L. REV. 385 (1996); RICHARD T.
PETERSON, DEMOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY AND THE POLITICS OF KNOWLEDGE (Pennsylvania State
Press 1996); J. ROGERS HOLLINGSWORTH AND ROBERT BOYER, CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM: THE
EMBEDDEDNESS OF INSTITUTIONS (Cambridge Univ. Press 1997); JEFFREY H. REIMAN, CRITICAL
MORAL LIBERALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 1997).
24. YAEL TAMIR, LIBERAL NATIONALISM (Princeton Univ. Press 1993).
25. ERIC HOBSBAWM, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM SINCE 1780, at 31-32 (Cambridge Univ.
Press 1990).
26. Samuel J. Barkin & Bruce Cronin, The State and the Nations: Changing Norms and Rules
of Sovereignty in International Relations, 48 INT. ORG. 107, 112 (1994).
27. See DAVID HELD, POLITICAL THEORY AND THE MODERN STATE (Cambridge Univ. Press
1991); KENNETH DYSON, THE STATE TRADITION IN WESTERN EUROPE (Martin Robertson 1980).
28. Barkin & Cronin, supra note 26, at 112.
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sonal autonomy and individual rights and freedom, and sustain a
commitment for social justice both between and within states.32
The desire of liberals to protect individual autonomy could benefit from
the efforts of nationalists to promote the culture and status of the group.
Thus, the notion of convergence should be rejected not only because
nationalism exists as an alternative ideology to liberalism, but also
because liberalism itself may appear in many forms.
B. A Single Form of Knowledge
The second assumption commonly acted upon, although rarely
acknowledged by foreign intervenors, is the idea that there is one form
of knowledge - a universal, transtemporal, abstract, objective truth.
33
According to this orientation, the search for universal truth is an una-
voidable dilemma for those who believe in human rights and social
change.34 In searching for principles that can guide their work, foreign
actors tend to behave as if knowledge has its situs exclusively in the
spheres of the powerful, and not in the realm of the "subaltern," that is
from those who have been subordinated according to any system creat-
ing a hierarchy of difference based on relations of domination and subor-
dination.3" Under this scenario, outside "experts" (such as the election
monitor or human rights observer) play a particularly important role in
knowledge formation. In the privileged position of "objective" messen-
ger and observer, the foreign "expert" delivers the message to the locals
(for example, the message about human rights) and then reads the locals
for consumption back home.
Alternative ways of thinking about knowledge challenge this lim-
ited vision. First, knowledge exists in many sites. Alternative forms of
knowledge can be read from below, from the experiences of those in the
subaltern. 36 Competing claims to truths can be seen within states and
communities. At times, competing truths can be found in the main "pub-
lic sphere," that is the "institutionalized arena of discursive interac-
tion."37 Yet often the institutionalized public sphere is not truly open to
all voices, and some interlocutors are muted in their attempts to speak.
32. Id. at 6.
33. See, PETERSON, supra note 23.
34. See e.g., Francesco Belvisi, Rights, World-Society and the Crisis of Legal Universalism, 9
RATIO Juis 60 (1996).
35. Dianne Otto, Subalternity and International Law: The Problems of Global Community
and the Incommensurability of Difference, 5 SOCIAL AND LEGAL STUDIES 337 (1996); Gayatri
Chakravorty Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?, in MARXISM AND THE INTERPRETATION OF
CULTURE 271-313 (Nelson & L. Grossberg eds., Univ. of Illinois Press 1988).
36. Cf. Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L REV. 323 (1987).
37. Nancy Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually
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In such cases, the subordinated groups create their own fora for expres-
sion. Nancy Fraser describes these fora as "subaltern counterpublics,"
that is "parallel discursive areas where members of the subordinated
social groups invent and circulate counter discourses, which in turn per-
mit them to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities,
interests, and needs." 38 Where the subaltern fear retribution for exercis-
ing their voice, they may create coded means of expression.39 Although
the foreign observers may not be able to hear or understand them, the
subaltern nearly always find some way to speak.
It follows that the outside "expert" does not have a privileged claim
to objective knowledge. Rather, the reading of the "expert," like all read-
ings, is filtered through his/her own cultural/social/political preconcep-
tions.4n Moreover, just as "experts" read their subjects, the subjects read
the "experts." Locals carefully select the information they disclose to
visiting "experts," calculating how best to serve their own agendas.
Acknowledging locals as subjects and not mere objects can be disturbing
for "experts." "The realization that 'they' can read 'us,'" Jean Franco
writes, "spreads like glaucoma over the once confident imperial eye.'
In the exchange of information and the location, perpetuation and
manipulation of truths, locals are every bit as active as "experts."
Through their failure to engage in a two-way exchange of experi-
ence, many foreign intervenors unwittingly promote an image of them-
selves as the beneficent outsider and their "clients" as the passive
recipients. They, thereby, draw a line between the knowing and the
needy. The foreign intervenors give their "clients" the programs they
want to give, often to actors that they have created or that still exist only
in their imagination, and they extract the information they had imagined
they would find. Few see their "clients" as actors with their own agen-
das, and even fewer imagine that they could learn something from their
"clients" that could help transform their own societies. Yet just as for-
eign "experts" leave their mark on the societies they encounter, the
Existing Democracy, in POSTMODERNISM AND THE RE-READING OF MODERNITY 198 (Francis
Baker, et al. eds., Manchester Univ. Press 1992).
38. Id. at 210.
39. JAMES C. SCOTr, DOMINATION AND THE ARTS OF RESISTANCE: HIDDEN TRANSCRIPTS
(Yale Univ. Press 1990).
40. See Renato Rosaldo, Culture & Truth: The Remaking of Social Analysis (Beacon Press
1993); CLIFFORD ET. AL. EDS., WRITING CULTURE: THE POETICS AND POLITICS OF ETHNOGRAPHY
(Univ. of California Press 1986); WOLFGANG FIKENTSCHER, MODES OF THOUGHT: A STUDY IN
THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW AND RELIGION (J.C.B. Mohr 1995).
41. Jean Franco, Globalization and the Crisis of the Popular, in THE LEGACY OF THE
DISINHERITED: POPULAR CULTURE IN LATIN AMERICA: MODERNITY, GLOBALIZATION, HYBRIDITY
AND AUTHENTICITY 265 (Tom Salman ed., CEDLA 1996).
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experience changes the experts: they will never return home again quite
the same.
"Experts" are disarmed in yet another manner: localisms challenge
universalisms. One can believe in "core values" or "universal truths"
common to all faiths and cultures and still acknowledge the impact of
localisms in translating the message of the outsider (i.e. the message of
human rights) into something that makes sense locally. Foreign interven-
tions, from humanitarian aid to democratization programs, often exacer-
bate individuation 42  and particularism, instead of promoting
universalisms. Rather than leading to the construction of some "global
community,"43 "world without borders"'" or "global culture,"45 outside
interventions spark the creation of reactive, fortified local communities.
As Lash and Urry note with respect to the political economy, "Broadly
speaking. . .local powers tend to be reactive, to resist decisions from
centers, and to devise institutional and policy responses through identi-
fying niches in existing forms of social organizations."46 Moreover, by
creating and-privileging selected local organizations, the intervenors cre-
ate new boundaries within society between those who have and those
who do not have foreign contacts and capital. Those left out often react
by retreating to an insular group, which gains its identity through oppo-
sition to the privileged.
In times of economic crisis, as in many countries of Eastern
Europe, external intrusions are especially likely to be regarded as threat-
ening, leading to withdrawal and closure of the niches of family, ethnic-
ity, nation and religion.47 These niches attempt to preserve their
distinctiveness on the basis of "frontal insulation" ("disassociation" or
"delinking")48 and distance themselves from the global forces through
42. By individuation, I refer to "the process of increasing the autonomy and distinctiveness of
the actors at both the collective and individual levels." MLINAR, supra note 3. Mlinar identifies
the dimensions of individuation as: (1) the weakening of predetermination on the basis of origin;
(2) the weakening of determination on the basis of territory; (3) increasing the diversity of "time-
space paths" (that is, not being limited to the role and position of individuals in space at a specific
moment in time); (4) increasing control and decrease of (random) intrusions from the external
environment (wherein actors assert greater control over the impulses from the environment); and
(5) increased authenticity of the assertion of identity (more direct assertion of identity without the
use of intermediaries or representatives).
43. Mary Catherine Bateson, Beyond Sovereignty: A Merging Global Civilization, in
CONTENDING SOVEREIGNTIES: RETHINKING POLITICAL COMMUNITY 145-58 (R.B.J. Walker & Saul
Mendlovitz eds., 1990).
44. LESTER RUSSELL BROWN, WORLD WITHOUT BORDERS (Random House 1972).
45. MIKE FEATHERSTONE ED., GLOBAL CULTURE: NATIONALISM, GLOBALISM AND MODERNITY
(1990).
46. LASH ET. AL., THE END OF ORGANIZED CAPITALISM 284 (Univ. of Wisconsin Press 1987).
47. Henry Teune, Multiple Group Loyalties and the Securities of Political Communities, in
MLINAR, supra note 3, at 105-114.
48. MLINAR, supra note 3, at 2.
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(re)creation of their oppositional local culture. These reactions may rep-
resent positive developments in that they may help preserve local cul-
ture. However, they may at times forewarn of regressive developments
as the threatened local also often attempts to preserve its identity by
lashing out against a local enemy "other."
In their interpretation of the universals promoted by outsiders,
locals draw from their own historical and contemporary experiences.
Dov Shinar notes that, "blueprints for social change cannot be copied or
imposed in their entirety; and particular cultural identities have to be
considered."4 9 With no alleged universalism, this is truer than with
democracy. As Rob Walker observes, "principles of democracy have
been worked out with any degree of conviction only in relation to a
particular somewhere. . ." Thus, "place" still plays an important role,
preventing the move from particularity to homogeneity.5 '
In Eastern Europe, in both the institutionalized public sphere and
the subaltern counterpublic, locals craft truths to address (that is, to fit or
challenge) the competing ideologies of nationalism and liberalism. All
of these truths are claims to power that shape human behavior. What
matters most is that people believe them, not that they are universal,
static, objective or even factually true. Many "rule of law" and "democ-
ratization" intervenors rely too heavily on the creation of institutions and
the propagation of good laws. They fail to recognize that individual and
group perceptions about international law shape behavior and model
social change more than the positive law itself.52 Locked into believing
in one form of universal, objective knowledge, intervenors often fail to
hear these perceptions and competing truths. As a result, outside plans
to transplant universalisms do not take root, but instead bring about
unintended and often ill-fated consequences.
C. Compartmentalization of Political Space
The traditional Western political map is highly compartmentalized,
"highly linear, incredibly precise (at least in appearance), partitioned
into distinct parcels, and continuous in the sense that, with only a few
exceptions.. .it is entirely 'filled'. Moreover, the separate compartments
are perceived as being imbued with a sense of independent integrity and
49. Dov Shinar, 'Re-Membering' and 'Dis-Membering' Europe: A Cultural Strategy for
Studying the Role of Communication in the Transformation of Collective Identities, in
GLOBALIZATION, COMMUNICATION AND TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL SOCIETY 63-87 (Sandra Braman &
Annabelle Srebemy-Mohammadi eds., Hampton Press 1996).
50. WALKER & MENDLOVITZ, ed., supra note 43, at 142.
51. JOHN AGNEW, PLACE AND POLITICS: THE GEOGRAPHIC MEDIATION OF STATE AND
SOCIETY (Allen & Unwin 1987).
52. JULIE MERTUS, Kosovo: How MYTHS AND TRUTHS STARTED A WAR (1999).
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internal homogeneity. ' 53 Acting within this framework, foreign inter-
venors most often presume dichotomies between the local and the global
and between the state and the global. While the intervenors may view
themselves as part of a larger global project (of human rights, democrati-
zation, liberalization, humanization, etc.), they often understand their
role in affecting change as limited to the local. They perceive social
change as connected to place that is to the local actors and existing insti-
tutions. For its part, the State may see itself as an actor in the global
scene, but it conceals and overlooks the local by reifying the local as a
"dimension of the state or of pre-political civil society. 54
This compartmentalization of political space must be rejected in
favor of a more fluid vision of global, local and state and with a
decreased role for the increasingly porous state. This section examines
the impact of globalization on the changing role of the state and the
local. Although the discussion treats the state and the local separately,
their transformations are interrelated and overlap.
(1) THE STATE
Supporters of the Statist paradigm argue that a state-based system
must be preserved in order to promote world security. According to this
argument, individual rights are best protected through a system of rela-
tively strong states; transsovereign activities, such as international finan-
cial and labor markets are best policed through the negotiation between
sovereign states. The Dayton Peace Accords, for example, sought to
perpetuate at least the notion of a Bosnian state, if not a functioning
state.
The state-centric view of international law and social organization
has come under reconsideration from many commentators, and for this
reason, it will be dealt with briefly here.56 As a formal matter, interna-
53. See WALKER & MENDLOVrrz, supra note 43, at 130. See also, EDWARD W. SOJA,
POSTMODERN GEOGRAPHIES: THE REASSERTION OF SPACE IN CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY (Verso
1989).
54. Warren Magnusson, The Reification of Political Community, in WALKER & MENDLOVITZ,
supra note 43, at 45-60.
55. The post-Dayton Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina - a shell which is less than the sum of
its component parts, the Serbian entity of Republika Srbska and the Bosnian-Croat entity of the
Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina JULIE MERTUS, ED. ET AL., THE SUITCASE: REFUGEE VOICES
FROM BOSNIA AND CROATIA (Univ. of California Press 1997) - serves the interest of world
powers and those who can retain power in the new creation, not most locals. The existence of the
state of Bosnia helps assuage the guilt of many international actors for failing to act during the
war. Also, by perpetuating the statist paradigm, Dayton furthers the liberal agenda.
56. See, e.g., Richard K. Ashley, Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the
Anarchy Problematique, 17 MILLENIUM: J. INT'L STUDIES 227 (1988); THOMAS J. BIERSTEKER &
CYNTHIA WEBER, SOVEREIGNTY AS A SOCIAL CONSTRUCT (Cambridge Univ. Press 1996); Joseph
A. Camilleri, Rethinking Sovereignty in a Shrinking, Fragmented World, in WALKER &
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tional and regional legal systems and mechanisms are indeed state-cen-
tric, but in practice, states are often weak and transitional, and state
boundaries are increasingly permeable.57 Instead, power has shifted to
forces above and below traditional state boundaries. On the one hand,
power has moved down to sub-state grouping, such as national groups
and other entities of identification and belonging, and, on the other hand,
out to the transsovereign forces impervious to state boundaries. In turn,
the loyalties of individuals and groups are torn away from the state to
these dichotomous forces of sub-states and transsovereigns. For many,
to be an individual living in Europe these days means to be European
and a member of their national group, and only then a citizen of their
country.
As a concomitant of their integration into and participation in
transsovereign actors, states experience limitations on their classical
sovereignty.58 So, for example, such states face restrictions on their
ability to guard their borders against intrusions from an increasing
number of external regulations, including human rights and humanita-
rian laws. Today's market endeavors are also characterized by a culture
of postmodernity,59 including enhanced mobility in capital and labor. A
new paradigm would "have to take into consideration the whole gamut
of nonstrategic and nonnuclear factors that now imperil the functioning
of states big and small, from food and energy price rises to the pollution
of the environment in which we live, threats that do not respect either
the boundaries or the sovereignty of states."6°
The rise of alternatives to the state paradigm is not likely to
threaten state security. After all, perpetuation of the state paradigm itself
is multi-edged - it serves the interest of some and is as likely to preserve
peace as it is to spark conflict. 6' In their study of a state-bound concept
of sovereignty and a notion of sovereignty linked to nation, Barkin and
Cronin found that "the degree of violence 'defined as total physical
harm that comes to people' is not necessarily any greater with any given
understanding of sovereignty. 62 Only the sites of violence have
changed, from inter-state to intra-state violence. In many parts of Central
MENDLOVITZ, supra note 43, at 13-44; ROBERT H. JACKSON, QUASI-STATES: SOVEREIGNTY,
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE THIRD WORLD (Cambridge Univ. Press 1990); WALKER &
MENDLOVITZ, supra note 43.
57. LEO Louis SNYDER, GLOBAL AND MINI-NATIONALISMS: AUTONOMY OR INDEPENDENCE?
(Greenwood Press 1982).
58. MLINAR, supra note 3, at 23.
59. FREDIC JAMESON, POSTMODERNISM OR THE CULTURE OF LoGic OF LATE CAPITALISM?
(Duke Univ. Press 1991).
60. JOHN HERZ, THE NATION STATE AND THE CRISIS OF WORLD POLITICS 19 (1976).
61. WALKER, supra note 10, at 139.
62. Barkin & Cronin, supra note 26, at 130.
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and Eastern Europe today, we see intra-state violence because the legiti-
macy and status of nations has grown and the power and authority of
states has declined.
Foreign intervenors must still deal with the states of Eastern
Europe. After all, the states grant visas, permission for foreigners to
work in the country, and allow the passing and importation of equipment
and supplies. Nonetheless, foreign intervenors must also deal with actors
that exist above and below the state. For example, diaspora groups
(governmental and non-governmental), military complexes and arms
dealers, and trade bodies and transsovereign NGOs act as forces above
the state influencing politics and society within that state. Below the
state, intervenors may work both with groups that are part of the domi-
nant power and those of the subaltern.
(2) THE LOCAL
Just as globalization has altered the meaning and power of the state,
it has changed the meaning of the local. With the development of new
technologies, forms of communication and ease of movement, the notion
of local has lost its geographic meaning. The media plays a crucial role
in the blendings of local and global, and thus local life is no longer
separate from "the world out there."63 "Modernity thus simultaneously
liberates time and space from the particularities of place, allowing dis-
tanced interaction via the modern social organization."64 This does not
mean that the local has lost its importance, rather only that the local now
can be understood more in a phenomenological sense as the "habitual
settings through which an individual physically moves."65
The phenomenological understanding of local is especially relevant
in the case of Eastern Europe, an area from which so many people are
on the move, as refugees, displaced people, guest workers, asylum seek-
ers and immigrants. The place of culture and the location of truth is
constantly shifting,66 and thus "the local" can be found both at home and
abroad.67 Intrusion of external forces and the process of individuation
may still result in the (re)creation of social units tied to the geographic
environment - what Mlinar terms "reterritorialization."68 Nevertheless,
63. John Tomlinson, Global Experience as a Consequence of Modernity, in BRAMAN &
SREBERNY-MOHAMMADI, supra note 49, at 71.
64. Id. at 66; ANTHONY GIDDENS, MODERNITY AND SELF-IDENTITY: SELF AND SOCIETY IN
LATE MODERN AGE 189 (Polity Press 1991).
65. Tomlinson, supra note 63, at 66.
66. HOMI BHABHA, THE LOCATION OF CULTURE (Routledge 1994).
67. Cf. Jost Delbruck, Global Migration-mmigration-Multi-ethnicity: Challenges to the
Concept of the Nation-State, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 45 (1994).
68. MLINAR, supra note 3, at 25.
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unlike the socio-spatial differentiations in the past, the resulting entity
will be flexible, temporary and less bounded by fixed boundaries. 69
There is an experience of global in the everyday, "situated" lives of peo-
ple in the local. As Giddens observes:
In conditions of late modernity we live "in the world" in a different
sense from previous eras of history. Everyone still continues to live a
local life, and the constraints of the body ensure that all individuals,
at every moment, are contextually situated in time and space. Yet the
transformations of place, and the intrusion of distance into local
activities, combined with the centrality of mediated experience, radi-
cally change what "the world" actually is ...Although everyone
lives a local life, phenomenal worlds for the most part are truly
global.7°
At the same time, the international now has domestic content.7 '
The nature of this experience is complex. To the extent that the liberal
agenda has become part of a global movement, it has found its way to
the local level of everyday life. Interwoven in this experience in Eastern
Europe is the local phenomena of nationalism working its way back to
the global. For example, the global agenda of liberalism has concrete
and immediate impact on many day to day realities in Eastern Europe,
from the types of produce offered in the grocery, to the possibility of
working abroad, to the purchasing power of one's weekly paycheck.
The local phenomena of nationalism has an impact on global matters by
influencing such issues as which workers go abroad, the number of peo-
ple filing for amnesty or refugee status, and the amount of financial and
strategic resources international, regional and state security forces spend
in the upcoming year.
"Cross-level linkages" further break down the division between
local and global. Alger writes that "local people have invented a variety
of ways to cope with [the foreign] intrusions."72 When government or
the institutionalized public sphere fails to address the global intruders,
local people may take matters into their own hands, establishing their
own contacts with transsovereign actors. Indeed, in Eastern Europe
69. Refugees from the former Yugoslavia, for example, may create enclaves of identity based
on many factors, such as the areas from which they came, the place to which they have come, the
place to which they want to go, and/or their national identity. At times, one or a combination of
these factors may take precedence over all others. The exact priority allotted to the factors and
degree of forgiveness the group gives to people who do not fit the requirement changes over time.
See, MERTUS, supra note 55.
70. GIDDENS, supra note 64, at 187.
71. Bruce Andrews, The Domestic Content of International Desire, 8 INT.L ORG. 321 (1984).
72. Alger, supra note 3, at 100; see also R.B.A. DiMuccio & James N. Rosenau, Turbulence
and Sovereignty in World Politics: Explaining the Relocation of Legitimacy in the 1990s and
Beyond, in MLINAR, supra note 3, at 60-76.
[Vol. 53:921
MAPPING CIVIL SOCIETY TRANSPLANTS
many such "cross-level linkages" exist between local people and global
systems and actors, from black market economic activities to refugee
rights advocacy.
By recognizing that their actions have both global and local ramifi-
cations, foreign intervenors can act with an eye to the interwoven conse-
quences of their actions and better serve their "clients."73 In addition,
breaking down compartmentalization will help intervenors to recognize
cross-level linkages that exist between global and local and, thus, to dis-
cover new sources for exchange of information and experience.
PART Two: COMPARISONS WITH CIVIL INTERVENTIONS IN
LATIN AMERICA
The trends described above apply to Latin America with a twist, a
twist informed by geopolitics and by the different sets of assumptions
intervenors make about the people, actors and institutions of Latin
America versus Eastern Europe. This section outlines some of the main
points of departure for an assessment of the Latin American experience
with foreign interventions and raises questions for further exploration.
Perhaps the most significant variable in forming the work of
outside intervenors in societies in transition is the relationship of West-
ern world powers (or, more accurately stated, the U.S.) to prior regimes.
In general, Western intervenors have been more willing to work with the
remnants of the old regimes in Latin America than those in Central and
Eastern Europe. In marked contrast with the experience in Latin
America, Western intervenors in Eastern Europe have been more willing
to support lustration laws designed to keep members of the prior regime
out of office.74 This is not surprising given that the U.S. helped to estab-
lish and maintain many of the old regimes in Latin America while prior
regimes in Eastern Europe were branded as the enemy in accordance
with Cold War rhetoric.
Another justification commonly given for the difference in treat-
ment is that pre-transition governments in Latin America (for example in
Argentina, Uruguay and Chile) were hierarchically-led military regimes
and authoritarian in nature, while the governments in Eastern Europe
were totalitarian in nature.75 Totalitarian governments are arguably more
73. Here, "clients" refers to donees.
74. See Herman Schwartz, The Lustration Decisions of the Central European Constitutional
Courts, in 2 CONSTITUTIONALISM & HUMAN RIGHTS 137 (Andrzej Rzeplinski ed., 1995); Mark F.
Brzezins, Constitutionalism And Post-Communist Polish Politics, 20 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COM. L.
J. 433 (1988).
75. For explanation of these terms, see Alfred Stephan, Paths Toward Redemocratization:
Theoretical and Comparative Considerations, in O'DONNELL, TRANSITIONS FROM
AUTHORITARIAN RULE, supra note 5, at 64-84.
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likely to taint the next regime with their prior bad acts than authoritarian
governments.76 Under totalitarian regimes, little separates the party from
the State. Those who favor lustration laws and other measures to censure
party leaders of prior regimes argue that these harsh steps are necessary
to purge a formerly totalitarian state of its nondemocratic elements.
After all, the bureaucracy and coercive elements of totalitarian govern-
ments are recruited in line with political criteria that define the old
regime. Party membership was required for a large number of
nomenkalura jobs in Eastern Europe while in Latin America far fewer
jobs were based on political criteria defined by the old regime. By
design, the imprint left by the totalitarian line in Eastern Europe will
take longer to fade.
Foreign intervenors reason that much more of the state apparatus
from authoritarian regimes is "'available' and usable by the new demo-
cratic forces. ' 77 This argument, however, ignores the fact that in many
cases in Latin America the military was essentially the State and "the
military establishments [of Latin America] often bear direct responsibil-
ity for the repression and policies of the authoritarian regime. 78 Ignor-
ing the deep imprint left by military regimes, foreign intervenors reason
that much more of the state apparatus from authoritarian regimes is
"'available' and usable by the new democratic forces." While expres-
sing regret at the inability of Latin American countries to deal with
human rights offenses committed under prior regimes, foreign interven-
ors in Latin America seem to have less of a problem dealing with the
remnants of the prior regimes in Latin America than in Central and East-
ern Europe.79 Consequently, their programs in Latin America are more
likely to involve the support and participation of political leaders regard-
less of their relationship to the prior regime.
The nature of foreign interventions in societies in transition is fur-
ther defined by the perception of local and foreign actors of the relation-
ship between state, democracy and human rights. What is the
relationship between these three variables - state, democracy and human
rights - as they are perceived by both insiders and outsiders? The per-
ceived relative strength of the State and its participation in the reform
76. JUAN J. LINZ & ALFRED STEPHAN, PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND
CONSOLIDATION: SOUTHERN EUROPE, SOUTH AMERICA AND POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE 249-252
(Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1996).
77. Id. at 252.
78. Russell Bova, Political Dynamics of the Post-Communist Transition, in LIBERALIZATION
AND DEMOCRATIZATION: CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE 113-138 (Nancy
Bermeo ed., 1992).
79. See THOMAS CAROTHERS, IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY: U.S. POLICY TOWARD LATIN
AMERICA IN THE REAGAN YEARS (1991).
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effort plays a key role in answering this question. Where foreign inter-
venors perceive that the general populace needs a strong state, more
effort will go into state-building. Where intervenors think that a strong
state and democracy must come before human rights, some human rights
violations will be overlooked in the reform effort. This has been the
general trend in Latin America, at least whenever the strong state was
thought to be more favorable to the U.S. than an alternative entailing
long- or short-term instability.8" By contrast, where human rights are
made a priority, undemocratic elements and weak state boundaries will
be overlooked in reform efforts. Such is the experience in many parts of
Eastern Europe when the human rights violations at issue involved civil
and political rights.81
Given their different political histories, the local understanding of
"civil society" differs for the people of Eastern Europe and Latin
America. Dissident groups in some parts of Eastern Europe cultivated
their own brand of "civil society against the state." In Poland and
Czechoslovakia in particular, dissidents used the moral discourse of
"truth" and the existential claim of "living in truth." They sought to
cultivate an ethical civil society that lay not only outside the state but
also against the state, a "politics of anti-politics." This ethical civil soci-
ety held the belief that what is essential to a just order is not a benign
government and good people in power, but rather a vital, active, aware,
self-governing and creative society. Most foreign intervenors, particu-
larly those from Western traditions, have a much different view of civil
society, that is civil society as groups acting in the own self-interest (not
in the interest of a higher "truth"), striving to direct the State, at times
even working with the State. For outside intervenors then, anti-politics,
civil society groups pose a danger to their agenda of reform.
Although anti-politics, civil society was a factor in some palacts in
Latin America, such as post-transition Brazil, in general, it was far more
prevalent in Eastern Europe than in Latin America. In Latin America,
other problems with the definition and operation of civil society con-
founded outside intervenors. Illegal political parties had created some of
the movements self-identified as "civil society." Once these political
parties became legal, they no longer were interested in the mobilization
of civil society but rather they became coopted by the new State. These
80. See, e.g., id. at 120-125; LARRY DIAMOND, ET. AL. EDS., CONSOLIDATING THE THIRD
WAVE DEMOCRACIES: REGIONAL CHALLENGES 37 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1997).
81. See Mertus, supra note 21, at 806. See generally, Fionnaula Ni Aolain, The Fractured
Soul of the Dayton Peace Agreement: A Legal Analysis (on file with author) (perhaps one of the
most extreme examples of this is the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina where the international
community promoted minimal human rights guarantees while tolerating a weak state with many
defects in its democratic structure).
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and other differences in the understanding of civil society have a tremen-
dous impact on the degree to which local groups are receptive to the
"civil society" projects of foreign intervenors. In addition, local under-
standing influences the ways in which the foreign transplants are
adapted, assimilated or applied locally.
A related problem, which holds particular relevance for foreign
intervenors interested in transporting Western constitutional law are the
differing conditions and possibilities for constitutionalism in Eastern
Europe and Latin America.8 2 The historic time period and political con-
text in which constitutional formulas are adopted goes a long way
toward explaining whether they reflect the efforts of outside intervenors
and, if so, which ones. Choices for constitutional reform may include:
restoration of a previous democratic constitution (Uruguay and Argen-
tina not used in Eastern Europe); creation of a provisional constitution
with great outside influence (witnessed throughout Eastern Europe and
parts of Latin America); retention and revision of old constitution (as
seen for a short time in Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia); imposition of a
constitution imposed by outside actors (i.e. post-Dayton Bosnia-Herze-
govina).83 To some extent it seems as though provisions in Western
European (and to a lesser respect, U.S.) constitutions are readily trans-
ported to Eastern European countries. These countries desperately want
to castaway the influence of the Soviet Union and to join the Western
World. In light of this, French and German constitutions provide partic-
ularly good models for many countries as their legal system is grounded
in the Romano-Germanic legal family. In contrast, countries in Latin
America are eager to disengage themselves from "traditions of vertical
dependence and exploitation [by European countries and, later, the
U.S.]." 84 Historically derived social contexts presented Latin Americans
and Eastern Europeans each with a different set of opportunities and
incentives.85
Another major difference between Eastern European and Latin
American transitions is the challenge faced in Eastern Europe of making
82. See, e.g. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY, ED., THE REBIRTH OF DEMOCRACY:
12 CONSTITUTIONS OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE (2d ed. 1996); RETT R. LUDWIKOWSKI,
CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN THE REGION OF FORMER SOVIET DOMINANCE (1996).
83. See generally Paul C. Szasz, The Quest for a Bosnian Constitution: Legal Aspects of
Constitutional Proposals Relating to Bosnia, 19 FORDHAM INT'L. L.J. 363 (1995); LARRY
DIAMOND, ET. AL. EDS., supra note 80, at 219-224; YossI SHAIN & JUAN J. LINZ, BETWEEN
STATES: INTERIM GOVERNMENTS AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS 20-21 (Cambridge Univ. Press
1996); Mertus, supra note 21; Aolain, supra note 81.
84. ROBERT PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY 179
(1993).
85. Id. Robert Putnam makes this point not with respect to Latin Americans vis a vis Eastern
Europeans but Latin Americans vis a vis North Americans.
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political and economic transformations at the same time. "In Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union, in addition to making a political transition
to democracy, the countries have simultaneously had to make a transi-
tion to market economies."86 Foreign intervenors in Latin America and
Eastern Europe provide different answers to the riddle: which comes
first, the market or the democracy? In Eastern Europe we see wide-
spread acceptance of the paramount importance of the market and the
notion that the market will legitimize democracy. In Latin America, in
contrast, the pyramid was inverted and in general, democracy was said
to legitimate the market.87 This initial point of orientation has a
profound effect on the entry point of foreign intervenors into the two
regions.
While foreign intervenors in Eastern Europe are most likely to ride
in on a market reform bandwagon, intervenors in Latin America were
often more interested in the electoral process. Although intervenors in
Eastern Europe also hold courses in political parties and free elections,
their efforts are more likely to be packaged with economic incentives.
To some extent the differences are a sign of the times and a product of
post Cold-war politics and globalization, but they also stem from deeper
differences in conceptualization about "the south" versus "the east" as
posited against "the west". The different treatment also may be
explained by its racial dimension - i.e. the notion that some people are
more easily "led" than others - and a post-colonial element in that the
different treatment in Latin America stems from the legacy of colonial-
ism of the South whereby Europeans established and controlled Latinos
and indigenous peoples.
The Eastern European identity captured in the minds of Western
intervenors is markedly different from their perception of Latin Ameri-
can identity. A rhetoric of primordialism, for example, clouds the West-
ern imagination about the people in the Balkans. Politicians shrug their
shoulders over the Balkans, sighing that these people have been killing
each other for years and years, it is "in their blood" and there is nothing
we can do about it.88 Acceptance of this thesis in the Balkans may
explain some of the ways in which western aid to the Balkans has dif-
fered from that in Latin America. For example, when Milan Panic chal-
lenged Sobodan Milosevic in the December 1992 Presidential elections,
the West sent fewer than thirty election observers, apparently because
the West accepted the notion that support for a greater Serbia was so
86. LINZ & STEPHAN, supra note 76, at 244.
87. See CAROTHERS, supra note 79.
88. See, e.g., ROBERT D. KAPLAN, BALKAN GHOSTS: A JOURNEY THROUGH HISTORY (St.
Martin's Press 1993).
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strong that Milosevic was unbeatable (Panic did end up with 42 percent
of the vote despite a Kosovo Albanian boycott of the elections and
alleged election fraud on behalf of Milosevic).8 9 In contrast, in the 1988
plebiscite in Chile that led to the defeat of Pinochet, there were
thousands of western election observers, many of whom arrived months
before the election. 90 While we do not hear the same "Balkan primordi-
alism" rhetoric in Latin America, intervenors in the development area
have historically differentiated between "primitive" and "evolved" popu-
lations there: the primitive were incapable of development; the evolved
were suited to their projects. Additional misconceived notions held by
outside intervenors stand in the way of effective contributions to reform
efforts in that region. Misconceptions about the desires of indigenous
populations, the role of race in society and the role and nature of Cathol-
icism in Latin America are included.
Foreign intervenors also construct the identity of their subjects by
negotiating the rhetoric of complexity versus the rhetoric of simplicity.
In Eastern Europe, and in particular, the Balkans, Western politicians
have long contended that the situation on the ground is simply too com-
plex to comprehend who is doing what to whom. As a result, would-be
foreign intervenors decline to "take sides," refusing, for example, to call
the Yugoslav and Serbian military the aggressor in such clear-cut cases
as the attack on Vukovar in Croatia. In Latin America, the United States
has a history of accepting an opposite rhetoric of simplicity, labeling the
sides "bad" and "good." Even in the face of proven human rights abuses,
the U.S. remains steadfast in its support of the designated "good guy."
The competing rhetoric of simplicity and complexity have had a
profound influence on the ways in which the neoliberal agenda has been
exported to Latin America and Eastern Europe. In general, programs in
Latin America have centered upon support for the designated good guy
while Eastern European programs have tended to reach out broadly - or
at least to those not directly connected to the prior regime.
Another point of departure for considering the role of foreign inter-
venors rests in their relationship to what Juan Linz and Alfred Stephan
call the "stateness problem." 9' As explained above, in many countries in
Eastern Europe the liberal agenda competes with nationalism and, as a
result, there are "profound differences about the territorial boundaries of
the political community's state and profound differences as to who has a
right of citizenship in that state."9 It is well accepted by convergence
89. LINz & STEPHAN, supra note 76, at 434 n. I.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 16.
92. Id.
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thinkers that in Central and Eastern Europe the model of a liberal, mar-
ket-oriented democracy cannot be transplanted to any degree until the
"stateness problem" - i.e. who is in and who is out - is resolved. The
same commentators do not see the need for the resolution of the state-
ness problem in Latin America. Linz and Stephan contend that the litera-
ture on transitions in Latin America did not give much thought to the
"stateness problem" because "the challenge of competing nationalisms
within one territorial state, or the question of who was a citizen of the
new democratic polity, was on the whole not a salient issue."93 This
explanation is only half true. Struggles between identity groups in Latin
America were never traditionally framed as competing nationalisms, but
still the question of who was entitled to be a full citizen of a new demo-
cratic polity and the territorial boundaries of that polity was very much
in dispute, if not acknowledged by commentators. Instead of a national
dimension, tensions over state formation and operation in Latin America
had a racial or indigenous dimension, for example pitting Latinos
against Indians, and/or a colonial dimension, pitting the colonial rulers
against the colonialized.
In both parts of the world, "resolution" of the "stateness problem"
has frequently been far from satisfactory. For the people of Eastern
Europe, the creation of a state of any kind has traditionally portended
conditions under which the politically powerful national and/or numeri-
cally significant nation will rule over political and numerical minori-
ties.94 For the people of Latin America, state creation and transformation
has meant perpetuation of the legacy of colonialism and/or subjugation
of politically powerless indigenous and racial groups. To what extent
can these struggles be analogized? How can these historic trends
explain local reluctance to embrace the specific offerings of foreign
intervenors? These are crucial inquires that must be made in order to
understand differences in civil foreign interventions in Eastern Europe
and Latin America.95
CONCLUSION
The concept of legal transplants via civil society, rule of law, and
democratization projects has new currency today as foreign intervenors
hasten to create new societies in Eastern Europe. The concept of legal
93. Id. (quoting O'DONNELL et. al., supra note 5).
94. See generally LISA LUKKARI, EL SALVADO, INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 117 (Jack Donnelly & Rhonda E. Howard eds., 1987); Jacques Lambert, Latin America:
Social Structure and Political Institutions, in COMPARATIVE LAW: WESTERN EUROPEAN AND
LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEMS (John Henry Merryman & David S. Clark eds., 1978); Mertus,
supra note 21.
95. Further work of the author develops these thoughts further.
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and political transplants in Eastern Europe has been under-theorized and,
as a result, we have failed to see the assumptions made in such endeav-
ors. This essay begins to fill the void by offering a framework of
assumptions and counter-assumptions. Additionally, the analysis of the
liberal agenda in Eastern Europe has also tended to be ahistorical,
wholly lacking any comparative element to previous and contemporary
interventions elsewhere. Yet, the notion of reforming worlds has a dis-
tinctly old taste. The people of Latin America have experienced foreign
intervenors for years, first as imperial and colonial powers trying to
reshape Latin America to serve their purpose and, then, as a wave of
U.S. democratization intervenors who continue to carry out this goal.
This essay suggests some of the ways in which interventions in Latin
America are quite distinct from the interventions taking place in Eastern
Europe today. These observations are intended to form a point of depar-
ture for continuing a dialogue about how foreign programs of interven-
tion can become a more supportive tool for positive social change in
societies in transition.
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